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ANDREW P. VANCE MEMORIAL
WRITING COMPETITION
WINNERS
THE BEEF HORMONE DISPUTE ANDCAROUSEL SANCTIONS: A
ROUNDABOUT WAY OF FORCING
COMPLIANCE WITH WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION DECISIONS
Rosemary A. Ford"
"[Tihe historian will see that trade was the principle of
Liberty; that trade planted America and destroyed




In 1989, the European Union ("EU")2 imposed an absolute
prohibition on the use of synthetic hormones that resulted in a
ban of hormone-treated beef imported from the United States.!
* J.D. (Candidate 2002), University of Pennsylvania Law School. The
author wishes to thank Professor Curtis R. Reitz for his thoughtful advice.
1. Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Young American, Lecture before the
Mercantile Library Association (Feb. 7, 1844), in NATURE: ADDRESSES, AND
LECTURES 302-03 (1895).
2. The European Union was previously known as the European
Community, and the World Trade Organization still uses that designation in
its decisions. For the sake of clarity, the author has used EU throughout this
paper except when referring to a World Trade Organization decision.
3. For a brief chronology of the EU's Hormone Ban, see U.S. Dep't of
Agric. Foreign Agric. Serv., FASonline, Chronology of the European Union's
Hormone Ban, at http-//www.fas.usda.gov/itp/policy/chronology.html (last
visited Mar. 6, 2002).
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In 1996, the U.S. appealed the ban4 following the dispute
settlement procedure enacted along with the creation of the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") in 1994.' After an adverse
panel decision6 had been appealed by the EU in 1997, 7 the WTO
appellate body issued a ruling against the EU that required it
to lift the hormone ban in the absence of any scientific risk
assessment of harm.8 A subsequent arbitral ruling authorized
U.S. countermeasures against the EU for non-compliance with
the decision within the fifteen-month accepted time period.9
The countermeasures took the form of 100% ad valorem l U.S.
tariffs on certain imports, up to an amount equivalent to the
$116.8 million of lost revenues that the arbitration panel
determined the U.S. was losing annually as a result of the
4. See European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), Request for Consultations by the United States,
WT/DS26/1, Doc. No. 96-0359 (Jan. 31, 1996), at http'J/www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e/dispu_e/distabasewtomembers2_e.htm [hereinafter U.S. Request
for Consultations].
5. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Concerning the
Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994), available at
http'//www.wto.org/englisbldocs_e/legal-e/28-dsu.pdf [hereinafter DSU].
6. See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
Complaint by the United States, Report of the Panel, WT/DS26/R/USA, Doc.
No. 97-3368 (Aug. 18, 1997), at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e
dispu-e/distabase_wtomembers2_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Panel Report].
7. See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
Notification of an Appeal by the European Communities under Paragraph 4
of Article 16 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU), WT/DS26/9, Doc. No. 97-4084 (Sept. 25, 1997),
at http'//www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/distabasewtomembers2_e.
htm.
8. See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
AB-1997-4, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/ABIR, Doc. No. 98-0099
(Jan. 16, 1998), at http://www.wto.org/Englishtratop-e/dispue/
distabasewtomembers2_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Appellate Body Report].
9. EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) -
Arbitration Under Art. 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Award of the Arbitrator, WT/DS26/15,
Doc. No. 98-2227, T 48 (May 29, 1998), at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/distabasewtomembers2_e.htm
[hereinafter WTO Arbitrator Award].
10. Meaning "according to the value" of the article, as opposed to by
weight. BLAcK'S LAw DICTIONARY 53 (7th ed. 1999).
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ban." Despite these legal rulings, the imposition of the tariffs
and numerous trade negotiations, by the beginning of 2001 and
the dawn of a new American administration, the European ban
stood bloodied but unbowed, barring imports from the U.S. of
high-grade, grain-finished beef.
12
B. Causes of the U.S.-EU Standoff
The causes of this stalemate are varied. They include
cultural and regulatory differences between the two entities, 3
as well as a possible agenda of protectionism. " In addition, the
dispute has highlighted the difficulty of enforcing compliance
with WTO rulings. In the now famous words of a former
11. European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), Original Complaint by the United States, Recourse to
Arbitrations by the European Communities under Articles 22.6 of the DSU,
Decision by the Arbitrators, WT/DS26/ARB, Doc. No. 99-2855, 83-84 (July
12, 1999), at http'//www.wto.orglenglishltratop-edispu-e/distbase_wto_
members2_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Arbitrators Decision]. The U.S. claimed
that actual losses ranged as high as $500 million annually. George H.
Rountree, Raging Hormones: A Discussion of the World Trade Organization's
Decision in the European Union-United States Beef Dispute, 27 GA. J. INTL &
COMP. L. 607, 610 (1999).
12. The EU imported 21.3% of its 1998 merchandize from the U.S. NATO
PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, COMMITTEE REPORTS, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY,
GENERAL REPORT: THE WTO AND THE US-EuRoPEAN ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP
(Nov. 2000), at http'/www.nato-pa.int/publications/comrep/2000/at-253-
e.html [hereinafter NATO REPORT].
13. Generally, EU food regulation is more supportive of traditional food
processes that consumers and regulators believe is natural even in the face of
scientific disapproval, and against food perceived as unnatural even in the
face of scientific approval. See Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulation in
the European Union and the United States: Different Cultures, Different
Laws, 4 COLuM. J. EuR. L. 525, 525-29 (1998). For instance, European laws
allow the production and consumption of raw milk cheeses and traditionally
cured meats, which are considered unsafe for human consumption by the
U.S. and many in the scientific community. See id. And, in contrast to the
relative acceptance of genetically engineered products in the U.S., Europeans
have called these organisms "novel foods," and demanded they be segregated
and labeled. Id. See also John Stephen Fredland, Unlabel Their
Frankenstein Foods!: Evaluating a U.S. Challenge to the European
Commission's Labeling Requirements for Food Products Containing
Genetically-Modified Organisms, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L 183, 184-85
(2000) (Genetically-modified agriculture and agricultural products are
considered as "Frankenstein Foods" in Europe.).
14. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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General Counsel to the Office of the United States Trade
Representative ("USTR"), "the WTO has no jailhouse, no bail
bondsmen, no blue helmets, no truncheons or tear gas.""5
The dispute over hormone-treated beef ("Beef Hormone") 6
began in 1987, prior to the creation of the WTO, when the U.S.
threatened to levy a 10% increase of duties on EU agricultural
products 7 pursuant to section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.18
For a short period, the U.S. and EU were able to negotiate an
"interim measure" that allowed for some import of U.S. beef in
return for the lessening of section 301 tariffs. 9 In 1989, the
General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs ("GATT") council
convened on the dispute, but discussions stalled."° Eventually,
in 1996, two years after the establishment of the WTO, the
U.S. requested a WTO consultation regarding the hormone
ban.2' Under the VITO Dispute Settlement Understanding
("DSU"), the jewel in the crown of the Uruguay Round,'
"consultation" was the first part of a possible four-tier
settlement process that the Beef Hormone dispute would test to
its limits.23
15. Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Settlement Understanding: Less is
More, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 416, 417 (1996).
16. The WTO refers to the case as "EC Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones)." See, e.g., supra notes 4, 6-9 & 11. The author
shall use the term "Beef Hormone" when referring to the dispute.
17. Dale E. McNiel, The First Case Under the WTO's Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Agreement: The European Union's Hormone Ban, 39 VA. J.
INT'L L. 89, 110 (1999).
18. Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2000).
19. McNiel, supra note 17, at 110-11.
20. See id. at 109-110.
21. U.S. Request for Consultations, supra note 4. See also Rountree,
supra note 11, at 612.
22. The Congress had made an effective DSU a principal goal of the U.S.
negotiations during the Uruguay Round talks. Important changes from the
previous GATT dispute system included: (1) time limits for each stage of the
settlement process; (2) creation of an appellate body; (3) no requirement for
consensus in the adoption of decisions; and (4) automatic authorization for
countermeasures. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT AcT, STATEMENT
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, UNDERSTANDING ON RULES AND PROCEDURES
GOVERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES (Sep. 27, 1994), at 1994 WL 761797
[hereinafter SAA].
23. The four stages are: (1) consultations; (2) panel; (3) appellate body;
and (4) arbitration. See generally DSU, supra note 5; WTO, Trading into the
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In May 2000, wearied by the ineffectiveness of the WTO-
sanctioned tariffs and concerned about its domestic cattle
industry, the U.S. came up with a new twist on an old solution.
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the old solution, gave the
President discretionary authority to impose retaliatory
measures against any foreign government, act, policy or
practice that "burdens or restricts United States commerce,"
and violates international obligations.24 Section 407 of the
Trade and Development Act of 2000, signed into law by
President Clinton on May 18, 2000, added new bite to the so-
called section 301 sanctions by allowing the U.S. to rotate the
list of products targeted for tariffs every six months.25
The EU protested these "carousel" sanctions, arguing they
are illegal under WTO rules, and immediately filed a complaint
with the WTO.26 The EU and U.S. participated in the initial
consultation stage of WTO dispute settlement in July 2000.27
According to a USTR official, these talks were "formalistic,"
and not significant.2 To date, the U.S. has failed to implement
the rotation. British Prime Minister Blair was apparently able
to halt implementation in September 2000 when he expressed
concern over the possible demise of the Scottish cashmere
industry as a result of the proposed new tariffs.' The U.S. had
also been negotiating with the EU concerning its preferential
Future: Introduction to the WTO Settling Disputes, The Panel Process, at
http:J/www.wto.orgenglish/thewtoe/whatis e/tif-e/disp2_e.htm (last visited
Feb. 22, 2002).
24. Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C § 2411(a)-(b) (2000).
25. Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, § 407, 114
Stat. 251, 293-94.
26. See United States - Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974 and
Amendments Thereto, Request for Consultations by the European
Communities, WT/DS200/1, Doc. No. 00-2304 (June 13, 2000), at
http'//www.wto.org/english/tratop-edispu-e/distabase_wto_members4_e.htm
[hereinafter EU Request for Consultations].
27. Ian Elliott, European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy; United States
Trade Standards, Compliance, FEEDSTUFFS, July 17, 2000, at 2.
28. Off-the-Record Telephone Interview with Unnamed Official at the
Office of the United States Trade Representative (Jan. 30, 2001) [hereinafter
Telephone Interview].
29. See Larry Elliott et al., Blair Warns U.S. of Trade War, GuARDIAN
UNLIMITED (Sept. 7, 2000), at http'//www.guardian.co.ukArchive.
2002] 547
BROOK. J. INTL L.
tax treatment for foreign sales corporations,"0 and may have
wanted to strengthen its negotiating position by withholding
sanctions the EU perceives as controversial.3'
A new administration, lacking a negotiating history, may,
however, be less interested in preserving imports of luxury
woolen goods at the expense of the American cattle industry,
which has been the largest single U.S. agricultural sector for
the past forty years.32  For the last five years, despite its
extraordinary competitiveness, domestic cattle industry has
been in a state of crisis due to plunging cattle prices.33 One way
to help the downturn is to increase the volume of beef exports,
but figures show that the U.S. beef and cattle market is
already disproportionately liberalized compared to other
countries.34  Furthermore, although the $116.8 million
estimated by the WTO arbitration panel35 may not seem
significant in comparison with overall trading figures in the
billions of dollars, this 1996 number in no way reflects the
potential exports in a free-trade market to the largest import
bloc in today's global economy. Carousel sanctions may open
this market, and USTR Robert B. Zoellick has indicated that he
30. See Patrick Tracey, Agriculture: Subsidies to EU Farmers to be Phased
Out Over Next Decade, Trade Commissioner Says, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Jan. 5,
2001, at WL 1/5/2001 BTD d5. In February 2002, the WTO found for the EU
in this dispute with the U.S. See Daniel Pruzin, Steel: WTO Members to Meet
Informally to Sift Legal Responses to U.S. Steel Safeguards, INT'L TRADE
DAILY (BNA) (Mar. 13, 2002), at WL 3/13/2002 BTD d3.
31. See Daniel Pruzin, European Union: EU Initiates WTO Complaint to
Derail U.S. 'Carousel' Retaliation as Unilateral, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA)
(Jun. 7, 2000), at WL 6/7/2000 BTD d9.
32. The cattle industry has generated more than $30 billion in revenues
for the last dozen years. See Terence P. Stewart et al., Trade and Cattle:
How the System is Failing an Industry in Crisis, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
449, 452 (2000). For more information see U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Economic Research Service, at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FarmIncome.
33. See Stewart, supra note 32, at 452.
34. For instance, in 1997, the U.S. was the leading importer of beef in the
world with a forecast of 1.034 million metric tons ("MT") while the more
populous EU imported only 380,000 MT, and exported 910,000 MT. See id. at
492-93.
35. See id. at 501.
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thinks carousel legislation is a "powerful tool" for bringing the
EU into compliance with international trading rules.36
C. Summary
This Note will argue that carousel sanctions may offer an
attractive short-term political gain when applied to a dispute,
such as Beef Hormone that has run on for fifteen years without
a good faith resolution. Although the sanctions are trade
restrictive, the U.S. leads the world in its lack of trade barriers,
and perhaps can be forgiven for sparing use of this effective
tool. Because of its disproportionate trade liberalization, the
two-edged nature of sanctions is especially harmful to the U.S.,
harming the importer as well as the exporter. Carousel
rotation, however, means that importers only stay on the target
list for six months, thus redistributing the harm in such a way
that its impact is individually lessened, though affecting more
businesses. Ultimately, however, this Note argues that
sanctions are not in the U.S.'s best interest since their trade-
restrictive nature undermines this country's long and ardent
dedication to the principles of free trade." In addition, even if,
carousel retaliation is conceded to be permissible under
international law, which is not yet clear, sanctions have
alienated private businesses on both sides of the Atlantic.8
Finally, the WTO is slowly moving beyond the bilateral trade
concessions that inspired the signatories of GATT.3 9 The
multilateral standards represented by, for instance, the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures ("SPS Agreement") indicate a new legal departure for
36. See Gary G. Yerkey, Trade Policy: U.S. Will Reassert Leadership on
Trade, Pushing EU and Japan Aside, Zoellick Says, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA)
(Jan. 31, 2001), at WL 1/31/2001 BTD d2.
37. See Terry L. Anderson & J. Bishop Grewell, It Isn't Easy Being Green:
Environmental Policy Implications for Foreign Policy, International Law, and
Sovereignty, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 427, 438 (2001).
38. See, e.g., Gary G. Yerkey, European Union: Corporate Leaders Say
U.S.-EU Disputes Harming Business, Urge Quick Resolution, INT'L TRADE
DAILY (BNA) (Nov. 21, 2000), at WL 11/21/2000 BTD d12 ("These disputes
feed protectionist sentiment that gives rise to calls for retaliation which can
only have a negative impact on the business community.").
39. See WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO AGREEMENT ON SANITARY AND
PHYTOSANITARY MEAsuREs (1998), at http/vww.wto.org/english/tratop-.e
sps.e/spsunde.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2002).
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the WTO.' ° Multilateral standards could imply multilateral
enforcement, replacing the bilateral sanctions employed to this
point. This is the future toward which the U.S. must look even
if it recognizes the need for at least the credible threat of
sanctions in the interim.
In Section II, this Note will trace the history of the Beef
Hormone dispute through the dispute settlement process of the
WTO. This will include relevant social and political
background to the dispute. Section III will discuss the legality
and effectiveness of trade sanctions in general, and as a way of
forcing compliance with WTO decisions. Section IV suggests
alternate ways of enforcing compliance with WTO rulings that
strengthen the goals of global free trade.
II. THE BEEF HORMONE DISPUTE
A. Scientific Background
Beginning in the 1950's, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") and the Department of Agriculture
("USDA") approved the use of endogenous and synthetic bovine
growth hormones ("BGHs")41 as a safe, cost-effective way to
increase the feed efficiency in grain-fed cattle.4' The cattle
receive the hormones in the form of implants the size of pencil
erasers behind their ears.4'3 They are then able to convert the
grain, usually corn, with greater rapidity into the succulent,
high grade "marbled" meat that U.S. consumers enjoy.44 Most
40. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/doc e/legal-e/15-sps.pdf (last visited Feb. 23,
2002) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
41. The bodies of both humans and bovines produce three hormones in a
natural, or endogenous manner as opposed to synthetic hormones that are
manufactured. The latter have a slightly different molecular structure, but
otherwise mimic the function of endogenous hormones. See McNiel, supra
note 17, at 97.
42. See id. at 99-100.
43. Beef Hormones, CARGILL BULL. (Oct. 1996), at
http://www.cargill.comtoday/bulletin/t101996.htm.
44. Beef with fat deposits within the muscle tissue (marbling) is more
palatable to most people than lean beef without fat deposits. Marbling is
550 [Vol. XXVII:2
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of the beef exported from the U.S. is this choice cut variety.45
BGHs were widely adopted in the U.S. because of the
competitive advantage they gave to feedlots operating on razor-
thin, even negative profit margins.46 By contrast, in countries
with minimal demand, or a lack of financial resources to
support demand for fatty meat, cattle can be grazed without
expensive grain feedings and the resultant economic
desirability of BGHs
B. Political Reaction in Europe to Growth-Promoting
Hormones
Prior to 1981, European countries followed differing policies
on growth hormones.4 In 1981, reports alleging that Italian
children had grown enlarged breasts after eating imported
baby food containing veal treated with diethylistilbestrol
("DES")49 prompted an Italian boycott of veal imports from
countries where the hormones were allowed."0 In response to
popular concern, the Council of the European Communities
("Council") passed Directive 81/602,"' forbidding the marketing
of any new hormones pending further studies.52 Following the
Directive, the EU established a Scientific Working Group
("Scientific Working Group") composed of twenty-two
most easily produced by feeding grain to the growing/fattening animals. See
Rountree, supra note 11, at 607.
45. See U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, at
http'//www.ers.usda.gov/Briefingcattletlrade.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2002).
46. See Rountree, supra note 11, at 608.
47. See id.
48. See McNiel, supra note 17, at 100-01 (stating that prior to 1981, Italy,
Denmark, the Netherlands, West Germany and Belgium had either banned
or severely restricted use of the growth hormones whereas France, the United
Kingdom, Ireland and Luxembourg licensed some hormone products).
49. In 1954, DES was approved by the FDA for use in beef cattle but was
later found to be a carcinogen and banned in the U.S. in the late 1970's. Id.
at 99.
50. Id. at 101.
51. Council Directive 81/602, Concerning the Prohibition of Certain
Substances Having a Hormonal Action and of Any Substances Having a
Thyrostatic Action, 1981 O.J. (L 222) 32.
52. This meant that in some EU Member States all but one of the
hormones allowed in the U.S. were permissible. See McNiel, supra note 17,
at 102.
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prominent European scientists to determine if the use of
natural and synthetic growth hormones in animals had any
scientifically observable effects on human health.53 A year
later, in 1982, the Scientific Working Group issued an interim
report stating that it found no harm derived from the use of
endogenous hormones. 4 With regard to synthetic hormones,
the Scientific Working Group reported that it needed more
data.55
Despite the interim report, in 1985, the European
Parliament ("Parliament") adopted a resolution stating that
information regarding endogenous and synthetic hormones was
"far from complete."56 It also noted that an "over production of
meat and meat products . . . adds considerably to the cost of
CAP [the EU's Common Agricultural Policy]."" The European
resolution occurred in the context of the introduction of milk
quotas the previous year that had led to an increase of dairy
cattle slaughtered for meat, more than doubling EU
intervention stocks of beef.58 Following the adoption of this
53. The Scientific Working Group on Anabolic Agents in Animal
Production, also known as the Lamming Committee, was chaired by
Professor G.E. Lamming. See id.
54. See Communication from the Commission to the Council Concerning
the Use of Certain Substances Having a Hormonal Action in Animal
Production: Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 81/602
Concerning the Prohibition of Certain Substances Having a Hormonal Action
and of Any Substances Having a Thyrostatic Action, COM(84)295 final at 2.
The Scientific Working Group found:
[T]hat the use of oestradiol 17-B, testosterone and progesterone [i.e.
endogenous hormones] and those derivatives which readily yield the
parent compound on hydrolysis after absorption from the site of
application, would not present any harmful effects to the health of
the consumer when used under the appropriate conditions as growth
promoters in farm animals.
Id.
55. See id.
56. Resolution Closing the Procedure for Consultation of the European
Parliament on the Proposal from the Commission of the European
Communities to the Council for a Directive Amending Directive 81/602
Concerning the Prohibition of Certain Substances Having a Hormonal Action
and of Any Substances Having a Thyrostatic Action, 1985 O.J. (C 288) 158,
158.
57. Id.
58. See McNiel, supra note 17, at 104 n.98.
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resolution, a scheduled meeting of the Scientific Working
Group was canceled, and on December 31, 1985, the EU
banned the use of endogenous hormones with an exception for
therapeutic and zootechnical purposes, and placed a complete
ban on all synthetic hormones.59 Member States were given a
transition period of three years to bring their laws into
compliance." Two years later, in August 1987, the members of
the Scientific Working Group publicized what would become
their final report, concluding that the synthetic hormones they
studied were safe when used to promote growth.6'
C. Other Influences on European Thinking
In 1984, scholars introduced the "precautionary principle"
into international discourse in the First International
Conference on the Protection of the North Sea.62  This
controversial doctrine is still evolving, but, generally, it states
that in the face of uncertainty and ignorance of effects, as in
the case of possible marine pollution, science can inform
decision-making, but ethical and political considerations are
primary.6 The EU has subsequently incorporated it into
environmental policy,' advancing the principle as an
international environmental doctrine. 5 The EU is currently
using it to require labeling for genetically modified products.'
In defending the Council Directive banning the use of
59. Id. at 104.
60. See Council Decision 87/561 on Transitional Measures Concerning the
Prohibition on Administration to Farm Animals of Certain Substances
Having a Hormonal Action, 1987 O.J. (L 339) 70.
61 See Ban on Growth Hormone 'Political,' Scientists Say, MONTREAL
GAZETTE, Aug. 19, 1987, at A4.
62. JOEL TICKNER ET AL., THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN ACTION: A
HANDBOOK 2 (1999), available at http'//www.biotech-info.net/handbook.pdf
(last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
63. See id.
64. See Article 174 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
has a requirement to base "Community policy on the environment.., on the
precautionary principle and on the principle that preventive action should be
taken." TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, art.
174, O.J. (C 340) 3, 254-55 (1997).
65. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5fRev.1, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
66. See Echols, supra note 13, at 538.
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endogenous and synthetic growth hormones against various
legal challenges, the Court of Justice of the European
Communities ("ECJ") appeared to be applying precautionary
principles. It found that the ban need not be based on scientific
data alone, and that it was permissible to respond to political
concerns expressed by the Parliament and the "anxieties and
expectations" of consumers."
In 1986, bovine spongiform encephalopathy ("BSE"), or "mad
cow disease" was detected in the United Kingdom." Protein
supplements containing contaminated sheep and cattle offal
thought to cause the disease were forbidden in 1988, but the
regulation was not strictly enforced until 1991-92.69 By then,
the disease had reached epidemic proportions, bringing output
of the British beef industry to its lowest level in twenty years.70
Despite extraordinary, and until recently successful, EU efforts
to contain the outbreak,' the public loss of confidence in food
safety continues to color European attitudes. The recent
outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the United Kingdom73
will not help to change these attitudes.
67. Case C-331188, The Queen v. Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food and the Secretary of State for Health ex parte: Fedesa and Others, 1990-
10 E.C.R. 1-4023, 4061-62, I 7-10 (1990).
68. See Sean Henahan, Mad Cow Disease: The BSE Epidemic in Great
Britain, An Interview With Dr. Frederick A. Murphy, ACCESS EXCELLENCE, at
http://www.accessexcellence.org/WN/NM/madcow96.html (last visited Mar. 6,
2002).
69. See id.
70. Ellen Ruppel Shell, Could Mad-Cow Disease Happen Here?, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Sept. 1998, at 92, 92.
71. See Michael D. Lemonick, Can It Happen Here?, TIME, Jan. 29, 2001,
at 58 (reporting recent outbreaks of the disease in Italy, Spain and Germany,
along with deaths in France and Ireland).
72. The trust that U.S. citizens place in the FDA is not shared by
European citizens whose governments and scientists have exposed them to
BSE, dioxin contaminated food and gene-altered maize that killed butterflies.
See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Prevention and Settlement of
International Trade Disputes Between the European Union and the United
States, 8 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 233, 252 (2000).
73. See, e.g., Sarah Lyall, Foot-and-Mouth Disease Intrudes, Putting
British Farmers in Dread, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2001, at Al.
554 [Vol. XXVII:2
20021 CAROUSEL SANCTIONS 555
D. The EU Hormone Ban Finds No Support in Science-Based
Risk Assessments
In 1987, the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food
Additives ("JECFAf)74 found no harm in the use of endogenous
hormones, and established acceptable daily intake levels and
maximum residue limits for two synthetic growth hormones.75
In a July 1991 meeting, the Codex Alimentarius Commission
("Codex"), whose standards guide the WTO in its decisions,
after much discussion, decided against adoption of the
acceptable daily intake limits prescribed by JECFA76 in a
decision that was primarily seen as political. 7 In 1995, again
after much discussion, 7  Codex adopted the JECFA
recommendations concerning the use of endogenous hormones
and the intake levels for the two synthetic hormones.79
In 1994, the SPS Agreement 0 was signed into law by 135
member countries as part of the Final Act of the 1984-1994
Uruguay Round re-negotiating the GATT."' The SPS
74. JECFA is a committee of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, a joint
endeavor of the Food and Agricultural Organization ("FAO") and the World
Health Organization ("WHO"), that provides influential guidelines
concerning food safety. The JECFA committee is an independent group of
international experts that focuses on the scientific evaluation of a veterinary
drug and does not consider government policies and politics. JECFA
recommends an acceptable daily intake and a maximum residue limit for a
veterinary drug residue in a specific food commodity. See Joint FAQ/WHO
Expert Committee on Food Additives, Fact Sheet, at
http//www.fao.org/es/esn/Jefca/what-e.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
75. See JOINT FAO/WHO EXPERT COMM. ON FOOD ADDITIVES, EVALUATION
OF CERTAIN VETERINARY DRUG RESIDUES IN FOOD: THIRTY-SECOND REPORT
(1988).
76. See CODEx ALIMENTARIUS COMM'N, REPORT OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
SESSION OF THE JOINT FAO/WHO CODEX ALIMIMENTARIUS COMMISSION,
Alinorm 95/37 (1995) [hereinafter CODEx REPORT]. See also McNiel, supra
note 17, at 108.
77. See McNiel, supra note 17, at 108.
78. See id. at 109.
79. See CODEX REPORT, supra note 76.
80. SPS Agreement, supra note 40, at Annex A, I 1(b) (defining a sanitary
or phytosanitary measure as one applied "to protect human or animal life or
health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from additives,
contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or
feedstuffs").
81. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS
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Agreement recognized the sovereign right of nations to take
measures that affect food safety and animal and plant health,
but stated that regulation shall not "arbitrarily or
unjustifiably" discriminate. 2 It also stated that regulatory
measures should be based on a scientific risk assessment.g In
drafting the SPS agreement to include a science-based risk
assessment, negotiators "looked at the EU ban on imports of
beef produced from cattle administered growth hormones as a
prototypical example." 4
E. The WTO Beef Hormone Decisions
1. The Panel Decision: A Victory for the U.S.
In April 1996, after consultations proved unfruitful, the Beef
Hormone dispute went before a WTO panel." The panel
determined that the SPS Agreement governed the dispute 6 and
that the ban was inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 5.1 and 5.5 of
the Agreement.87 Oddly, the panel did not look at Article 2,
arguably the heart of the SPS Agreement, which states that
measures can only be maintained with sufficient scientific
evidence. 8 Instead, it looked to Article 3.1 which imposes the
obligation on states to "base their sanitary and phytosanitary
measures on international standards . . .where they exist."9
The panel found a violation of this provision because the EU
standard was not based on existing Codex standards. ° Article
5.1 mandates that SPS measures must be based on an
assessment of the "risks to human . . . life or health . . .as
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
For the Final Act documents, see WTO, Legal Texts: The WTO Agreements, at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/final-e.htm (last visited Mar. 5,
2002).
82. See SPS Agreement, supra note 40, art. 5, T 5.
83. See id. 2.
84. See McNiel, supra note 17, at 90-91.
85. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 6.
86. For a discussion of whether hormonal substances naturally found in
meat should be called "contaminants," see McNiel, supra note 17, at 114.
87. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 6, T 8.271.
88. For a discussion of this issue, see McNiel, supra note 17, at 118-20.
89. See SPS Agreement, supra note 40, art. 3, T 1.
90. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 6, 1 8.77.
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appropriate to the circumstances."91 The panel determined that
the EU did not have a scientific justification for going beyond
international standards in instituting the hormone ban.92
Article 5.5 states that parties should avoid "arbitrary or
unjustifiable distinctions" in levels of protection if the
measures then result in "discrimination or disguised restriction
of international trade."" The panel found a violation based on
the difference between the extreme level of protection for added
hormones when compared with the lack of protection for these
hormones as they occur naturally in foods, such as meat and
dairy products,94 or compared with the unlimited residue levels
allowed for carbadox (a genotoxic substance) when used for
growth promotion.95
2. The Appellate Body Ruling Narrows the Scope of the Panel
Findings
The EU appealed the decision to the WTO Appellate Body
("Appellate Body") which overruled the panel's findings with
regard to Articles 3.196 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement, but
affirmed the holding that the EU had not based its regulation
on a scientific risk assessment, and thus violating Article 5.. 8
It was a Pyrrhic victory for the U.S. Some commentators felt
that the ruling weakened the SPS Agreement, demonstrating
its inability to deal with complicated global issues.98 The
Appellate Body's rejection of the Codex standards certainly
represented a step backward in the process of harmonizing
standards.99 Further, it overruled the requirement that the
assessment had to be concluded at the time the measure was
91. See SPS Agreement, supra note 40, art. 5, 1.
92. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 6, 8.137.
93. See SPS Agreement, supra note 40, art. 5, 5.
94. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 6, 8.216, 8.241 & 8.271.
95. See id. [ 8.197, 8.214 & 8.228.
96. See WTO Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, 165 (stating that the
SPS Agreement, although envisioning harmonization of standards in the
future, does not require that recommendations, such as the Codex guidelines,
be transformed into "binding norms").
97. See id. 197 n.120.
98. See Regine Neugebauer, Fine-Tuning WTO Jurisprudence and the
SPS Agreement: Lessons from the Beef Hormone Case, 31 LAW & POLy INT'L
Bus. 1255, 1256 (2000).
99. See, e.g., McNiel, supra note 17, at 133.
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implemented."° This left open the door to a scientific finding by
any scientist, orthodox or otherwise, that could provide the
basis for a permissible risk assessment as the Appellate Body
found that an SPS measure could derive from "a divergent
opinion coming from qualified and respected sources," rather
than exclusive reliance on "mainstream" scientific opinion.'0'
In addition, the SPS Agreement lists a number of factors to
be taken into account when conducting a risk assessment."
The Appellate Body decided this was not a closed list by adding
its own language: "The risk .. .under Article 5.5 is not only
risk ascertainable in a science laboratory ... but also risk in
human societies as they actually exist, in other words, the
actual potential for adverse effects on human health in the real
world where people live and work and die."103 This suggests a
scenario in which a party can include cultural preferences and
social values in its risk assessment. Thus, the precautionary
principle rejected by the panel, is revived in the Appellate Body
decision, albeit in circumscribed form.
3. The Arbitration Decision Allowed the U.S. to Impose
Countermeasures
The EU claimed that the Appellate Body ruling allowed it to
carry out a new risk assessment while keeping the ban in
place." The U.S. disagreed, arguing that the ban should now
be lifted within the "reasonable amount of time" stipulated by
Article 21, paragraph 3 of the DSU.'05 Since neither party could
agree on the timing, the matter was submitted to binding WTO
arbitration under paragraph 3(c). The arbitrator ordered EU
compliance within fifteen months, or by May 13, 1999.106 In
accordance with the U.S. argument, the ruling stipulated that
100. See WTO Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, 189 (What was
required was an "objective situation that persists and is observable between
an SPS measure and a risk assessment.").
101. See id. 194.
102. See SPS Agreement, supra note 40, art. 5, T1 5.
103. See WTO Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, 91 187.
104. See Rountree, supra note 11, at 628.
105. Id. at 628-29.
106. WTO Arbitrator Award, supra note 9, 1 48.
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the EU could not hold off legislative change pending a new
scientific assessment.
10 7
Fifteen months later, the EU had made no attempt to lift the
ban, nor had it come up with a new risk assessment. The WTO
approved a U.S. request for countermeasures and appointed an
arbitration panel to determine the amount. In July 1999, the
panel approved 100% ad valorem duties on a list of goods
drawn up by the USTR0 8 that could be imposed up to an
amount of $116.8 million.1 9 The U.S. immediately imposed the
duties on selected goods from its list."0 Although the EU had
shown willingness to negotiate before the arbitration decision,
it later retreated.1 ' This suggests that from the EU point of
view, the amount was set too low for Coasean bargaining,"' or,
perhaps, that the socio-political payoff from non-compliance
exceeded the harm from the tariffs.
Foreshadowing the protests in Seattle later that same year,
local Parisians reacted to the imposition duties by pelting a
McDonald's restaurant with apples, and the French town that
produces Roquefort cheese placed a 100% per unit tax on Coca-
Cola *sold in local vending machines."' In late November and
early December 1999, highly publicized protestors turned an
aborted WTO ministerial meeting into the "Battle in Seattle.""'
A loose coalition of environmentalists, trade union members
and others accused the WTO, among other things, of denying
Europeans the right to eat hormone-free beef."' It was a nadir
in U.S. trade relations, a view President Clinton conceded to
107. See id.
108. See WTO Arbitrators Decision, supra note 11, 55, 84.
109. Estimates of the damage to the U.S. cattle industry have ranged from
$100-500 million. See Rountree, supra note 11, at 610.
110. See WTO Arbitrators Decision, supra note 11, at Annex II. The list
included onions, Roquefort cheese, goose liver, fruit juice, mustard and pork
products.
111. See Rountree, supra note 11, at 633.
112. See id. (suggesting the EU lacked incentive to deal).
113. See Anne Swardson, Something's Rotten In Roquefort: A New U.S.
Tariff, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1999, at Al.
114. See, e.g., David Postman et al., Clashes, Protests Wrack WTO; Police
Use Tear Gas Against Blockade, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 30, 1999, at Al; John
Burgess & Steven Pearlstein, Protests Delay WTO Opening, WASH. PosT, Dec.
1, 1999, at Al.
115. See Jodie T. Allen & Dori Jones Yang, Trade's Battle Hits Seattle, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 13, 1999, at 20, 20.
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the distress of some observers, when he agreed with some of
the protestors' complaints.
1 6
III. FORCING COMPLIANCE THROUGH TRADE SANCTIONS
A. WTO Countermeasures
The DSU encourages prompt compliance with
recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body
("DSB").117  Under Articles 21 and 22, however, the DSU
contemplates three levels of response to non-compliance with a
DSB decision. Under Article 21, paragraph 3, the DSU allows
that if an immediate implementation of the DSB
recommendation is "impracticable," the non-compliant country
may have a "reasonable period of time" in which to comply."8 A
reasonable period can be proposed by the non-compliant party
if approved by the DSB."' If the DSB does not approve, the
time may be mutually agreed-upon by both parties.1 21 If this
too fails, the period of time will be determined by binding
arbitration within ninety days of the adoption of the DSB
ruling, 2' as was the case in the beef hormone case. Article 21,
paragraph 3(c) suggests that the arbitrator not exceed a period
of fifteen months, although it allows discretion for a shorter or
longer period.
The second level of response is for the parties to negotiation a
"mutually acceptable compensation." 22 Compensation is not
monetary, but involves the lifting of trade barriers by the
losing party, thereby supporting free trade principles."
Compensation is offered not only to the prevailing party, but to
all WTO members.' It is, however, rarely used. By contrast,
116. See id.
117. DSU, supra note 5, art. 21, 1. The DSB was established under
Article 2 of the DSU. Id. art. 2.
118. Id. art. 21, 1 3.
119. Id. 9I 3(a).
120. Id. 3(b).
121. Id. 3(c).
122. DSU, supra note 5, art. 22, IT 1-2.
123. See Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO:
Rules are Rules-Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 335,
337 (2000).
124. See, e.g., Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Mutually Acceptable
Solution on Modalities for Implementation, WTJDS10/19, Doc. No. 98-0138
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the third level of response, is purely bilateral in nature. It
allows the prevailing country to suspend "concessions or other
obligations under the covered agreements" to the non-
compliant country." Article 22, paragraph 3 lists the
principles and procedures that determine approval of the
proposed concessions that are to be suspended.126 In general,
the DSU requires, where possible, that suspended concessions
affect the same sector(s) as those implicated in the DSB
decision, or, failing that, sector(s) covered by the same trade
agreement.'27 It also requires that the level of suspensions are
equivalent to the level of "nullification or impairment" found by
the DSB." If the non-compliant country objects to the level of
suspensions proposed, or claims that the principles and
procedures of Article 22, paragraph 3 were not followed, the
country can refer the matter to arbitration, during which time
concessions may not be suspended. 29
Although the Uruguay Round improved GATT rules for
settling disputes, the DSU countermeasures reflect the GATT
scheme of privately negotiated, bilateral treaties in contrast to
the obligations of public international law. If a non-compliant
country does not agree to comply, the WTO cannot force
compliance. Instead, the prevailing country urges compliance
by restricting its trade concessions. 3 ' In addition, unlike public
international law, the DSU offers no remedy of reparation.
There is only prospective relief, and this relief may be delayed
by the reasonable period of time allowance and by
arbitration.13" ' The bilateral nature of the suspension of
concessions can disfavor prevailing countries who are
politically or economically weaker than the non-compliant
member. A small country may not want to suspend concessions
against a larger country that may have greater economic
(Jan. 12, 1998), at http'/www.wto.orgtenglish/tratop-e/
dispu_e/distabase_wtomembers3_e.htm (Japan offered compensation in the
form of tariff concessions for its delay).
125. DSU, supra note 5, art. 22, [ 1-3.
126. Id.
127. Id. T 3(a)-(b).
128. Id. 4.
129. See Id. J1 6-7.
130. Id. art. 3, 7. See also DSU, supra note 5, art. 22, 2-3.
131. See DSU, supra note 5, art. 21, 3.
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impact on the withholding country, but may nevertheless affect
the larger country's political decisions, such as granting aid.
Less obviously, a large, politically powerful party such as the
U.S. confronts a similar dilemma when enticing compliance
through trade restrictions, as WTO rules lack binding
authority.
The power to authorize countermeasures has been widely
perceived as a way of giving backbone to a previously
milquetoast GATT dispute settlement process. 3 ' The threshold
problem with this remedy is an inherent ideological
contradiction that arises when an organization founded on the
principle of free trade employs a measure that restricts trade. '33
If this objection is waived, the effectiveness of sanctions can
derive from their power to bring parties to the bargaining
table. The threatened sanctions should, therefore, present a
credible threat. In coming in at the low end of the harm, the
WTO arbitration decision against the EU in the Beef Hormone
dispute achieved the opposite result. It appears the EU has
decided that the cost of non-compliance is affordable. Its
political and cultural differences with the U.S. on this matter,
and perhaps most importantly, the protection of its own beef
industry, appears to be worth the punishment of export taxes.
In this way, the tariffs do little to remedy the initial harm
complained of by the U.S., while causing further harms to
small American businesses as well as their European
counterparts through import duties. Furthermore, the problem
with countermeasures that are set too low to induce compliance
is that they call into question the effectiveness of the dispute
settlement processes. Countermeasures that were intended to
be temporary' continue from year to year, and attention shifts
132. See, e.g., Carolyn B. Gleason & Pamela D. Walther, The WTO Dispute
Settlement Implementation Procedures: A System in Need of Reform, 31 LAw
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 709, 709 (2000).
133. But see Daniel R. Murray, Foie Gras?: Making Economic Sense of the
1999 U.S. Tariffs on Gourmet European Goods, 5 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 243,
256 (1999) (arguing that the tariffs are not protectionists but simply
equivalent to the amount the U.S. has paid to subsidize EU beef producers).
134. "The suspension of concessions or other obligations are temporary
measures available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are




to the failure of the settlement process to enforce compliance,
rather than the lack of compliance itself.
Sanctions are a double-edged sword that hurt a large
importing country, such as the U.S., as well as the exporting
country they are intended to punish. This applies tenfold when
the countries have the interdependent trading relationship like
the one existing between the EU and U.S.'35 A glance at the
products on the U.S. tariff list approved by WTO arbitrators in
the Beef Hormone case reveals a tendency toward high-end
food imports that presumably are calculated to strike a balance
of miniium harm to the U.S. and maximum harm to the EU.
136
The process, however, does not rule out short-term casualties.
The long-term harm is less tangible, but it clearly runs counter
to U.S. goals of global free trade.
B. Section 301 Sanctions
Since 1974, the principal means of addressing allegedly
discriminatory trade practices by foreign governments that
adversely affect U.S. trade has been sections 301-310 of the
Trade Act of 1974 (collectively "Section 301")."37 The provisions
of the Act empower the President, through the USTR (an
executive appointee)"38 to retaliate unilaterally with trade
sanctions against any unjustifiable or discriminatory act or
policy of a foreign country." 9
Although some trading partners thought that Section 301
would be replaced by the DSU, U.S. officials have stated with
intricate reasoning that Section 301 measures may actually be
more effective with the DSU." In 1998, the U.S. invoked
135. See generally NATO REPORT, supra note 12, at tbls.
136. See Murray, supra note 133, at 252.
137. Trade Act of 1974 §§ 301-310, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (2000).
138. See Jay L. Eizenstat, Comment, The Impact of the World Trade
Organization on Unilateral United States Trade Sanctions Under Section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974: A Case Study of the Japanese Auto Dispute and the
Fuji-Kodak Dispute, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 137, 139-40 (1997) (arguing that
although Article II of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign nations," that body has delegated authority
to the executive branch in order to project a pro-sovereignty position in trade
negotiations).
139. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)-(b)(1).
140. See, e.g., Overview of the Results of the Uruguay Round: Hearing
Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
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Section 301 against the EU in the EU-bananas dispute
("Bananas")14' in which the EU also had an adverse WTO
ruling, and the U.S. contemplated countermeasures pursuant
to Article 22 of the DSU."' The EU protested the use of Section
301 as an instance of unilateral enforcement by the U.S.
inconsistent with its Article 23 obligations that endorsed
multilateral enforcement of WTO decisions through the DSU.1
3
The EU instigated a separate legal inquiry into the legitimacy
of Section 301 within the dispute settlement process.14 With
great diplomacy, the WTO panel determined that despite the
discretionary elements of the statute in sections 304, 305, and
306 that appeared to generate a prima facie inconsistency, the
U.S. had pledged both before the WTO panel and in a
Statement of Administrative Actions that it would not exercise
this discretion contrary to its Article 23 obligations, and
therefore exercising Section 301 sanctions were permissible.
4 5
Historically, the U.S. has used sanctions to open up
otherwise inaccessible markets.4 ' It has been an effective tool
103rd Cong. 12 (1994) (statement of Hon. Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade
Representative); Results of Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations: Hearings
Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 103rd Cong. 195 (1994) (statement
of John H. Jackson, Hessel E. Yntema Prof. of Law, The University of
Michigan Law School).
141. This U.S.-EU case concerned the preferential treatment the EU gives
banana imports from certain countries. See generally European Community
- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Complaint
by the United States, Report of the Panel, WT/DS27/R/USA, Doc. No. 97-2070
(May 22, 1997), at http://www.wto.org/englishtratop-e/
dispuedistabase wtomembers2_e.htm [hereinafter EC-Bananas Panel
Report]. The nine-year-old Bananas dispute was resolved by the Bush
administration on Apr. 11, 2001. See Press Release, Office of the United
States Trade Representative, U.S. Government and European Commission
Reach Agreement to Resolve Long-Standing Banana Dispute (Apr. 11, 2001),
available at http://www.useu.be/issuesfbana04ll.htm.
142. See EC-Bananas Panel Report, supra note 141, $ 11.21.
143. See Seung Wha Chang, Taming Unilateralism Under the Multilateral
Trading System: Unfinished Job in the WTO Panel Ruling on U.S. Sections
301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 31 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1151, 1155
(2000).
144. See id.
145. See id. See also United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of
1974, Report of the Panel, WT/DS152/R, Doc. No. 99-5454 (Dec. 22, 1999), at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/distabase-wtomembers4_e.htm.
146. See Chang, supra note 143, at 1157.
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that is popular with Congress. Since 1974, over ninety-eight
cases have been filed under Section 301.147 According to one
study, the threat of sanctions led to trade liberalization in 70%
of cases,148 indicating that the successful use of sanctions can be
attributed largely to the credible threat of retaliation and not
in actually levying them.4 9 The clear implication for the Beef
Hormone arbitration is that the WTO did not furnish the U.S.
with an award that presented a credible threat.
C. Carousel Retaliation
In May 2000, the first major trade legislation to pass
Congress since 1995, the Africa-Caribbean Basin Initiative Bill
("Africa-CBI Bill") was signed into law by President Clinton.' 50
This bill contained provisions that allowed the USTR to employ
a carousel approach to trade sanctions by rotating the products
on its Section 301 list every six months. 51 House Committee on
Agriculture Chairman Larry Combest, a co-sponsor of the
"Carousel Retaliation Act," described the economic impact of
the provisions as "what comes around, goes around."1 2
Carousel sanctions attempt to give teeth to WTO
countermeasures by testing the legal limits under Article 22 of
the DSU. They do not challenge the bilateral nature of
enforcement, nor the prospective nature of the remedy.153
147. See Eizenstat, supra note 138, at 159.
148. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 117 (1989). See also Thomas 0.
Bayard, Comment on Alan Sykes' "Mandatory Retaliation for Breach of Trade
Agreements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301," 8 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 325, 325 (1990).
149. See id.
150. See Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114
Stat. 251.
151. See International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development,
Africa-CBI Trade Bill Passes Senate; Carousel Provisions Ignite EU-US
Tensions, at http'//www.ictsd.org/html/weekly/storyl.16-05-00.htm (last
visited Feb. 24, 2002).
152. Press Release, United States House of Representatives Committee on
Agriculture, Combest, Stenholm Pursue New Strategy on Trade Violations
Carousel Retaliation Act: What Comes Around Goes Around (Oct. 1, 1999),
available at http'//agriculture.house.gov/106/pr991001.html. See also H.R.
2991, 106th Cong. (1999).
153. See Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114
Stat. 251.
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The WTO arbitration decision in the Beef Hormone dispute
refers directly to carousel sanctions. M The report cites a U.S.
promise: "Although nothing in the DSU prevents future
changes to the list ... the United States has no current intent
to make such changes."'55 It continues:
We thus assume that the U.S. - in good faith and based
upon this unilateral promise - will not implement the
suspension of concessions in a carousel manner. We therefore
do not need to consider whether such an approach would
require an adjustment in the way in which the effect of an
authorized suspension is calculated.
116
Following passage of the Africa-CBI Bill, the EU requested
DSU consultations with the U.S. alleging that the sanctions
were impermissible:
Section 306, as amended, is in breach of the DSU since it
mandates unilateral action without any prior multilateral
control.... [The EU] further is of the view that the measure
is in breach of the obligation of equivalence, in that it creates
a structural imbalance between the cumulative level of the
suspension of concessions and the level of nullification and
impairment as determined under relevant DSU procedures.
57
The DSU allows sixty days for resolution of disputes through
consultation; after that the EU could request a panel to rule on
the complaint." 8 To date, the EU has not done this.
As a legal matter, carousel sanctions are not expressly
outlawed by the DSU. A recent proposal by the Philippines
and Thailand to amend Article 22, paragraph 7 of the DSU in a
way that would make it harder to impose carousel sanctions,5 9
suggests that the DSU as it stands does not prohibit them.
Furthermore, the short time-frame approach of carousel
sanctions is supported by a DSU policy that stresses the
154. See WTO Arbitrators Decision, supra note 11, $ 22.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Pruzin, supra note 31.
158. Id.
159. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO: WTO Members Gear Up for Talks on Dispute




temporary nature of countermeasures. 6 ' The EU alleges that
carousel sanctions violate the principle of equivalence under
Article 22.161 Paragraph 4 of Article 22 specifically states that
"[tlhe level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations
authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of
nullification or impairment."16' In Article 22, paragraph 7, the
DSU instructs that the arbitrator shall determine
equivalence."s Since the approved tariffs can be interchanged
on a pecuniary level so long as the total does not exceed the
amount of nullification and impairment specified by the
arbitrator, carousel sanctions do not violate pecuniary
equivalence. According to the EU, however, the rotated
products create an additional cumulative harm that exceeds
equivalence.'" Unfortunately, it is not clear from the available
record, how the EU quantifies this cumulative effect.
During consultations with the EU concerning carousel
sanctions, the U.S. refused to disclose details of its carousel
selection procedures." While this inscrutability may protect
the process from a finding of illegality on the part of the EU, it
is ironic coming from a party who has urged that the WTO
processes become more transparent.'66 In addition, although
U.S. secrecy preserves its right to act unilaterally from
multilateral interference, this posture raises questions of
sovereignty that generally arise when power is ceded to a
160. See DSU, supra note 5, art. 22, 8. "Prompt compliance with
recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure
effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members." Id. art. 21, 1.
161. See S.K. Ross & Assoc., P.C., Good Trade - New Law Encourages
African and Caribbean Commerce, at http'//www.skralaw.com/Articlesl
traderemedies.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
162. DSU, supra note 5, art. 22, 4.
.163. "The arbitrator acting pursuant to paragraph 6 [procedure for
arbitration] shall not examine the nature of the concessions or other
obligations to be suspended but shall determine whether the level of such
suspension is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment." Id. 7.
164. See EU Request for Consultations, supra note 26.
165. See Telephone Interview, supra note 28. The U.S. stated that
"carousel sanctions would be applied on a case by case basis, so no
generalizations regarding their implementation could be made." Id. The
U.S. position makes it "harder for the EU to build a WTO case against the
carousel sanctions law." Id.
166. See Pruzin, supra note 159.
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multilateral institution, rather than an executive appointee.167
Here, the USTR is appointed without a direct democratic
mandate, and with questionable constitutional authority,6 8 is
given a large amount of discretion to make decisions that
adversely affect U.S. businesses.
69
According to a USTR official, the same methods used to
select Section 301 products are used to choose the businesses
targeted for carousel sanctions. 7 ° First, a broad list is compiled
by government analysts for the Department of Commerce and
USDA, who comb through the tariff rates for every listed
product and its accompanying trade statistics.' Analysts look
for rates that are proportional, and in cases where reciprocal
products can be found, they are targeted.172 For instance, in the
Beef Hormone case, the U.S. initially targeted pork products.
73
The overriding goal is to pick those products where duties will
hurt the other side more than the U.S., but this process is more
art than science. 7 1 When dealing with the EU, which Member
State to target also becomes part of the selection equation.
175
Thus, after selecting pork products, the U.S. scaled back the
quantity of products targeted because it did not want to
unfairly burden Denmark, the EU's largest pork producer, as
Denmark is a relatively small EU Member State lacking large
political influence. 176 After compilation, the broad list is then
167. For further discussion of multilateralism versus sovereignty, see
Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International
Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000).
168. See, e.g., Eizenstat, supra note 138, at 139, 139 nn.11-12.
169. A limited amount of feedback concerning the targeted products is
permitted. See, e.g., Implementation of WTO Recommendations Concerning
the European Communities' Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, 64 Fed. Reg. 19209, 19210 (Office of the U.S. Trade
Rep. Apr. 19, 1999) ("The articles affected by this determination [Section 301
sanctions] were selected in light of the comments submitted to the Section
301 Committee in response to the October 22, November 10, and December
23 notices, and the testimony presented at the public hearing held on
December 9, 1998.").






176. See Telephone Interview, supra note 28.
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published and disseminated throughout government and
industry to give notice and solicit comment. 7 Responses to
carousel sanctions from industries targeted by Section 301
have been predictable: those already on the list like them
because it means they will rotate off more quickly, those off the
current list dislike them because they are now at risk of
selection in the next time period."
If carousel sanctions are found to be legal, their use by the
U.S. in the time-worn Beef Hormone dispute is perhaps
irresistible. The arbitration award has had little observable
effect on the EU, whereas the mere threat of carousel sanctions
has already caused the EU to jump.' 9 Beyond the general
problems with sanctions - they work better as threats, and
when used cut both ways - are those particular to a rotating
list of businesses. The first problem is the shadowy product
selection process with few procedural safeguards to ensure
equity, and even fewer objective measures of substantive
equity. A broader range of targets may increase equity by
spreading the pain more thinly on the U.S. side while
maintaining pressure on the EU, but unless the process is open
to analysis, this cannot be studied. A second problem is the ill-
will the sanctions will engender in the trans-Atlantic business
community.18 The use of carousel sanctions is a political as
well as legal decision, and it affects a widely dispersed range of
small businesses on both sides of the Atlantic that may not be
politically well organized.
IV. ALTERNATE WAYS OF ENFORCING COMPLIANCE
As flaws in the DSU process have become apparent, scholars
and international trade experts have proposed solutions.'
A. Reforming the DSU
An obvious solution to questions raised by the Beef Hormone
case is to look at the problems with the DSU and attempt
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See, e.g., EU Request for Consultations, supra note 26.
180. See Yerkey, supra note 36.
181. See, e.g., Gleason & Walther, supra note 132, at 728-35.
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repair by changing the process."2 The most glaring fault is the
time it takes to give an injured party relief.'83 Although it was
a goal of the U.S. GATT negotiators to impose "stringent time
limits on each step of the settlement process,""" the length of
time this case has taken despite favorable rulings at each step
has brought the U.S. no closer to its desired goal, or indeed
that of the DSU as expressed in Article 22, paragraph 1:
"neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or
other obligations is preferred to full implementation of
recommendation to bring a measure into conformity, with the
covered agreements."'85 In practice, temporary suspension has
been too long in arriving and lasted too long in operation. The
arbitrators in the Beef Hormone dispute interpreted the
"reasonable period of time," articulated in Article 21,
paragraph 3(c) during which the losing party brings its
regulations into conformity, as "the shortest period possible
within the legal system of the Member to implement the
recommendations and rulings of the [Dispute Settlement
Body]."6 The EU procedures, however, dictated the full fifteen
month grace period.'87 Abuse of time by the losing party is not
contemplated by the DSU.
A non-compliant party has few obligations during the grace
period. Under Article 21, it must provide regular status
reports beginning six months after the period begins, but
nothing prevents a losing party from using the period to buy
additional months of non-compliance.'88 Additional monitoring
and surveillance during this period could prevent bad faith
simply by its presence or by tolling the time period in the face
of abuse.
Incentives under the current regime are also minimal. Since
suspension of concessions is not granted retrospectively, the
losing country has no reason to speed up implementation even
182. See id. at 734.
183. See id. at 713.
184. SAA, supra note 22.
185. DSU, supra note 5, art. 22, 1.
186. WTO Arbitrator Award, supra note 9, T 26.
187. Id. T 48.
188. See, e.g., Gleason & Walther, supra note 132, at 720-21 (describing
strong evidence of non-compliance well before expiration of the reasonable
period in the Bananas case).
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if good faith is assumed. Commentators have suggested that
requiring compliance, compensation, or withdrawal of
concessions at the time of the WTO ruling would be more
effective, and has been shown to work in the North American
Free Trade Agreement.'8 9 Alternatively, along with greater
surveillance during the grace period, imposition of double and
treble damages would discourage bad faith during the
implementation period.'O Others have suggested that the WTO
should be permitted to levy retrospective reparations similar to
those awarded by the International Court of Justice. 9'
B. Other Ideas
1. Compensating Trade Liberalization Measures
In November 2000, a CEO-level conference of the Trans-
Atlantic Business Dialogue suggested that in place of
sanctions, the U.S. and EU should look to "compensating trade
liberalization measures."92  This asks the non-compliant
country to lower its tariffs on other goods in such a way as to
offset the WTO violation.'93 This proposal takes even more
control away from the injured party, but has the virtue of
promoting free trade.
2. Multilateralism
One noted scholar has commented on the DSU (specifically,
Articles 3 paragraph 4; 3 paragraph 5; 3 paragraph 7; 11; 19
paragraph 1; 21 paragraph 1; 21 paragraph 6; 22 paragraph 1;
22 paragraph 2; 22 paragraph 8; and 26 paragraph 1(b)) by
suggesting that the "overall gist" of the provisions "strongly
suggests that the legal effect of an adopted panel report is the
international law obligation to perform the recommendation of
189. See id. at 733-34.
190. See id. at 734-35.
191. See Pauwelyn, supra note 123, at 339.
192. TRANSATLANTIC BusINEss DIALOGUE, CINCINNATI RECOMMENDATIONS 37
(2000), available at http'//www.tabd.com/recommendations/Cincinnati00.pdf
(last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
193. See Yerkey, supra note 36.
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the panel report."194 Although this is an extreme position to
take at this time, and few countries would likely accept an
international obligation based on an overall gist, it can be
interpreted as a forward-looking statement, signaling the path
the WTO is slowly taking toward multilateralism. Support for
reading WTO rules and DSU decisions as binding international
obligations has been found in DSU Article 3 paragraph 2 that
provides that WTO provisions are clarified "in accordance with
customary interpretations of public international law."195
Multilateral treaties, such as the SPS Agreement, which are no
longer based on the traditional balance of trade concessions
between parties, indicate that the WTO is venturing beyond
the original bilateral GATT framework.'96 Under this analysis,
enforcement of WTO obligations will become a multilateral
rather than a bilateral concern. In summary:
Once WTO rules have been accepted as international legal
obligations that affect individuals and merit collective
enforcement for the public good . . . and once this new
perception has come to be accepted and entrenched, it will be
increasingly difficult to justify both the absence of certain
traditional remedies, including reparation, and the lack of a
more effective system to induce compliance with WTO rules. 197
V. CONCLUSION
The political and cultural differences between the EU and
U.S. that have been highlighted by the Beef Hormone dispute
relate to differing attitudes toward food and science. They
were exacerbated by health crises in EU Member States and
the economic and political pressures of multi-million dollar
agribusiness. The acceptance of genetically modified
organisms is running into similar problems in Europe, and may
ultimately raise more complex issues for the WTO.'98 The
194. John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement: Understanding
Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60,
62-63 (1997).
195. Pauwelyn, supra note 123, at 341.
196. The customary rationale for enforcement of these agreements has
become "less relevant." Id. at 342.
197. Id. at 347.
198. See, e.g., Echols, supra note 13, at 528-29, 538 (describing the EU's
demand that foods containing genetically modified organisms be labeled).
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failures of the DSU and SPS Agreement with regard to the
Beef Hormone case may ultimately prove fruitful for future
amendments to the procedure.
In the meantime, the American beef industry is suffering,
and the U.S. has nothing to show after fifteen years of friction
with its largest trading partner and many favorable WTO
rulings. With regard to this dispute, the use of carousel
sanctions, if they are indeed legal, may seem justified by the
length of time the dispute has run, the bad faith evidenced by
the EU's lack of compliance and the economic equality between
these two giant trading partners. It is clear that DSU
procedures alone have failed both to enforce timely and
appropriate countermeasures on a non-compliant party, and to
ensure that the countermeasures are a temporary predecessor
to compliance. As suggested, it may be that multilateral
treaties such as the SPS Agreement at issue in the Beef
Hormone dispute may herald a future where multilateral legal
obligations replace bilateral trade sanctions, and prove more
effective in policing compliance with WTO rulings. All present
indications suggest, however, that progress along these lines
will be slow and politically volatile1i In reality, trade talks
take place in a political climate and in the context of many
different disputes and issues.2°' Thus, other considerations
altogether may influence the ultimate settlement of the Beef
Hormone dispute without regard to its extensively litigated
merits.
199. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
200. Currently, for example, the EU has asked the WTO to consider
countermeasures of $4 billion against the U.S. as a result of its favorable tax
treatment to foreign sales corporations, while in early March 2002, the U.S.
announced tariffs on imported steel that have alarmed affected WTO member
countries. See Pruzin, supra note 30.
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